On 22 May 2008, police raided the Roslyn Oxley9 art gallery in Sydney. A number of photographic works by renowned Australian photographer Bill Henson were removed on what was to be the opening night of his latest exhibition. The works featured photographs of partially naked adolescent youths, with an image of a shirtless 13 year old girl causing the most controversy. Police also announced that they intended to prosecute both Henson and the gallery with 'publishing an indecent article', an offence under both the Commonwealth and NSW Crimes Act.' While charges were never laid, the event was highly controversial, generating comments by the new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, and leading to a fissure between Rudd and the representatives of Australian arts and culture gathered in the 'Creative Australia' stream of the Prime Minister's 2020 Summit which had occurred just a short time previously. Numerous opinion pieces and articles appeared in both the broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, and later that year David Marr published a book about the event and the surrounding controversy.2
it has also exposed them to continually emerging and evolving dangers that did not previously exist.
In this article, we argue that the narrative of 'crisis' and 'danger' in terms of sex is one of the overlapping features of both the Howard and Rudd governments, and that it echoes a wider context of cultural anxiety around sex, and the sexualisation of crises more generally. 8 It is echoed in an influx of publications in recent years which similarly portray sex and sexuality as crisisridden. What is noteworthy in many of these publications is the prominence of traditionally radical feminist arguments, and their acceptance by both progressive and conservative commentators.
The most notable example of this is Ariel Levy's bestselling 2005 book, Female Chauvinist Pigs. Women and the Rise of Raunch Culture, which led conservatives and progressives alike to devote inches of broadsheet column space to the crisis represented by 'raunch culture'. 9 The book drew explicitly upon radical feminist figures such as Susan Brownmiller and Catherine MacKinnon to claim that women and girls are being victimised by an 'over-sexualised' society.
1° Subsequent to
Levy's book, the Australia Institute, a 'think-tank' associated with the progressive side of Australian politics, has published several reports on 'corporate paedophilia', linking concerns about 'raunch culture' with the ongoing progressive concern with the power and influence of corporations." Additionally, 2009 has seen the publication of Getting Real Challenging the Sexualisation of Girls, published by feminist publishing house, Spinifex Press, and edited by Melinda Tankard Reist, a 'pro-life feminist' long associated with conservative social politics for her anti-abortion activism. 12 This collection included contributions by well-known Australian leftists such as Clive Hamilton, the founder of the Australia Institute. Following Levy, the blame is generally laid at the feet of 'raunch culture', a phrase that has come to imply that any public representation of sexuality, whether Paris Hilton's sex videos or Bill Henson's nude photographs, is a product of, and furthers, the negative sexualisation of public life. 3 Hamilton's essay, 'Good is the New Bad: Rethinking Sexual Freedom' encapsulates this tendency, with its call from a progressive perspective for a rethinking of the goals of feminist and queer struggles around sex.
14 Hamilton has argued elsewhere that these ideas have 'become a reactionary force, for they have substituted an uncritical defence of the freedoms won in an earlier era for a real politics of social change'.1 5 We argue that there is an underlying discursive framework that unites these examples. It is one in which sex itself is framed as both in crisis and as constituting a crisis within wider society.
It cannot be dismissed as conservative as it draws upon the discourses of feminist and queer politics and activism around sex and sexuality to legitimate its claims and concerns. 16 Indeed, these contemporary crises are only thinkable within the context of the historical impacts of queer and feminist social movements. They point in important ways to the successes of these discourses
The Australia Institute describes its purpose as to 'help create a vision of a more just, sustainable and peaceful Australian societv and to develop and promote that vision in a pragmatic and effective way.' It was established in 1994 and is associated with the progressive side of Australian politics, with its current directors having political ties to the Australian Labor Party', the Australian Greens, and the Australian Democrats. The use of terminology in discussion of LGBT or queer movements is difficult, as the divisions are both political and historical. Each of these terminologies represents a particular politics in relation to identity and each has its critics. However, in contemporary common usage the terms tend to be relatively interchangeable, and the debates involving them are not our primary concern here. We are more interested in their commonality as referring to political movements and communities centred upon non-normative and non-heterosexual sexual identities and behaviours. As such we use whichever seems most appropriate to a particular example. in restructuring the ways in which sex is thought of and understood in society. In particular, they owe much to the feminist exposure and denaturalisation of the endemic and highly gendered nature of sexual violence, and the feminist and queer challenging of the idea that sex and sexuality constitute 'private' realms, separate from the public domain of politics and governance. However, while we agree with Hamilton that there is a problem with an uncritical defence of freedoms won and a lack of a real politics of social change, we differ in our conclusions as to the underlying causes of our contemporary political situation and in how to respond to this situation. This article is therefore not about the Henson case as such, although it provides the immediate impetus for our discussion. Our argument is that the case is not significant for its uniqueness, but rather that it is symptomatic of a discourse of crisis that surrounds issues of sex and gender in the Australian public sphere. Our argument in the remainder of this paper is that this discourse of crisis is linked to a politics of regulation and normalisation that threatens any radical or even progressive politics around sex and gender. We are interested especially in how feminist and queer politics are situated in relation to this discourse, and in the possibilities for a political response that goes beyond the current dynamic of crisis and normalisation. Our conclusions are based on examining the implications of this discourse of crisis for contemporary queer and feminist politics.
This article explores this discursive framework of 'crisis' through an historically-informed queer and feminist lens. In doing so we acknowledge the significance of feminist struggles against sexual assault and -along with gay, lesbian and queer activists -the ways in which discussion of sex, gender and violence was forced by these struggles into the public sphere, in effect initiating a 'crisis' in normative sexuality. However, in highlighting an historical shift in how feminism and queer politics interacts with the state and with law, we ask the related questions: 'What has become of a radical politics of sexuality?' and 'Why has the meaning of crisis shifted?' Specifically, we point to the decline in both feminism and queer politics of the utopian ideal of sexual liberation, the concomitant rise in community (and activist) reliance on the law and the state to regulate, control and delimit acceptable sexuality, and the construction of sex itself as a crisis in need of such legal and state intervention. Our primary interest is therefore in how narratives of crisis shifted within queer and feminist movements from a desire to initiate a social crisis within normative sexuality to one in which sexuality must be protected from being brought into crisis.
While our analysis is focused on Australia, we draw on material from elsewhere, most particularly the United States. We are cognizant of the important distinctions between Australia and other nations, particularly in relation to issues of reform and relationships to the State. However, we are also aware of the significance of parallels and mutual political and social influence. This is both because nations such as Australia and the US exist within what Goldie Osuri and Subhabrata Bobby Bannerjee have labelled the 'diaspora of whiteness', and because political developments in the politics of sex tend to resonate between these nations.'" This resonance can be seen in the international spread of the women's refuge movement or AIDS activism (despite local variation) or, in more recent times, the rhetorical similarities between national campaigns for same sex marriage rights.
SEX AND THE STATE
The prominent position that sex and sexuality now occupy in public politics is, in many ways, a legacy of second-wave feminist arguments that the personal is political and feminist and queer attempts to enact that maxim politically. Queer and feminist relations to the law have always been complex interweavings of desires for protection from harm, desires for recognition and desires for liberation from control. In Australia, these interwoven desires have been further complicated by relations to a state that has over the last few decades been more or less willing to respond to reformist demands of these movements, while co-opting their leaderships into positions of administration, advice and management. For Brown this process of abandoning the state and capitalism as sites of critique (and as limitations to be liberated from) is closely linked to an attachment to the self as a wounded subject, calling on the state to both redress the subject's injuries and protect the subject from future harm. In this way, politics is no longer a collective or even individual expression of desire for a different and better future but becomes a moralistic appeal to existing power structures, based on ressentiment and codified powerlessness.
2 0 In the case of queer and feminist movements . This connection between frustration, hostility and morality marks it as unique from a simple anger or resentment. In liberalism, Brown identifies an incitement to ressentiment, inhered as two related paradoxes -'that between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, a paradox which produces failure turned to recrimination by the subordinated, and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful"; and that between in Australia, however, it has also been the result of significant success in achieving legislative and other reforms. 21 However, feminist and gay movements have their own particular histories that have led them in this direction. For both of these movements, the relationship to the state, and to reform, has been shaped both by the particular history of Australian government, and a more broadly shared political trajectory with social movements internationally.
The election of the Whidam Labor Party in 1972 provided the Australian feminist movement with a left-fiberal government that was sympathetic to at least some of its objectives. The early 1970s therefore saw the emergence of an Australian state willing to engage with feminists and feminism, resulting in the particularly Australian phenomena commonly known as 'femocrats '. z2 This engagement continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s, making the history of Australian feminism quite unique in comparison with the United States. As Ann Genovese writes:
It was this convergence -of the aims of a social liberal state and of feminism -rather than US ideas of neo liberal market and feminism -that enabled a modicum of cooperation between law, state and women's political agendas ... we have to remember our story is different from that of the US; that this was not a story of being shut out, of having to rely on stricter formulations of sameness feminism, or using the 14th Amendment to affect rights based gains through the courts.
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In this way, Australian feminists have arguably had a far more empowered interaction with the state than that of the victimised and wounded subject described by Brown. If anything, this has, however meant that the state has been focused on less as a site of domination than the situation that Brown describes. The reform-focused agenda has led Australian feminists to make many compromises with 'institutions that had been designed to exclude them'. 24 The successes of Australian feminists in making achievements through state-based reforms are however, inarguable, and for many feminists, such as Genovese, more than justify the necessary sacrifice of the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality'. (As above at 67). 21 The process of enacting anti-discrimination legislation began in 1975 with the federal Racial Discrimination Act. This process continued with the first state anti-discrimination legislation enacted in New South Wales in 1977, and the passage of the federal Sex Discrimination Act in 1984. Contemporary anti-discrimination law in all federal, state and territory jurisdictions includes some provisions related to biological sex, gender expression and sexuality, sexual orientation, sexual preference or lawful sexual activity, although the specifics vary. Although the work to transform anti-discrimination law to address sexuality began much earlier, most progress was made in the 1990s, with some jurisdictions amending their laws in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Ongoing reform efforts also continue. In important ways however, Australian feminism was still influenced by the attachment to a wounded subjectivity which requires protection from the state. In Australia, as elsewhere, one of the biggest forces in changing feminists' relationship to the state was the discovery of an epidemic of sexual assault, and the subsequent focus on sex as a site of danger. This meant that feminists found themselves in the position of arguing for stricter sentencing and law enforcement measures in relation to sexual violence, a particularly marked shift for a movement that had largely emerged out of the New Left influenced anti-Vietnam war and civil rights movement in both Australia and the US. This meant that at its inception women's liberation movements tended to have a politics of distrust of law enforcement, and the police particularly. As Susan Brownmiller, one of the founding feminist theorists of rape, remarks in her autobiography, 'people forget what a sharp attitudinal reversal these legislative reforms [around sexual violence] signified.'
26 This shift, of necessity, moved away from a simple analysis of the state as a site of domination in its focus on making the instruments of the state -the law and courts -work for victims.
The tension in relation to the state reflected a deeper antagonism between the determination to enhance and celebrate women's sexuality and the need to address the endemic nature of sexual violence. In the 1970s, feminists challenged normative practices of heterosexuality in writings such as Anne Koedt's 'Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm', while the political dimensions of women's (hetero)sexuaity were rethought by writers such as Adrienne Rich in her influential article, 'Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence'. 27 At the same time the entrenched and structural nature of sexual violence was exposed by activists such as Brownmiller, who declared in Against Our Wi//." Men, Women and Rape that 'rape is a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear'.
28 By the 1980s, this antagonism had come to the fore in the US particularly in the conflict between radical feminists such as Brownmiller, and self-described 'sex positive' feminists. 29 The focus by feminists concerned with sexual violence on achieving legislative reforms has meant that their positions have gradually become the mainstream of public feminist discourse. 30 A particularly pivotal
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As above at 16. 30 An interesting statement of this position is made by Elisa Glick who argues that it is precisely the failure of 'pro-sex' feminist and queer theorists to move beyond identitarian cultural politics that has ceded the public definition of feminism moment in this shift was the emergence in the mid-1980s of 'date' or 'acquaintance' rape as a central issue for feminists. Particularly influential in this regard was the 1985 Ms magazine survey authored by Mary Koss, which produced the still-cited statistic that one-in-four American women would be a victim or rape or attempted rape in their lifetime. 31 The logical consequence of this epidemic of violence within normative sexual encounters was the impossibility of drawing an absolute boundary between sex and sexual assault, leading many feminists to characterise sex itself as inherently threatening for women.
Critiques of the violence inherent in what has historically been constructed as 'normal' or acceptable sexual relationships and practices have been amongst the most significant contributions made by second wave feminism. Given this, there are, however, problematic aspects to dominant feminist analyses of date and acquaintance rape. In the famous Ms magazine study, for instance, 73% of the women categorised by Koss as having experiences which met the legal definition of rape did not classify their own experiences as such.
3 2 While feminists point to the frequent 'split reality' between men and women's perceptions of sexual encounters, many women do not concur with feminist definitions of them as victims of sexual violence. 33 Thus, feminists may find themselves in the fraught position of attempting to convince women that, in the words of Sandra Bartky, 'feminist consciousness is consciousness of victimnizadion', and that the outcome of this consciousness is to 'come to see oneself as a victim'. 34 The problem with this logic is that it leads feminists to construct sexuality as a constant crisis, and one that cannot be overcome. To conceive of women's sexuality solely in terms of victimisation leads almost inevitably, as Wendy Brown has argued, to increased calls for state regulation, with little or no critical attention paid to the role of law and state power in producing and reproducing the very conditions that make rape not only possible but ubiquitous.
The response of lesbian and gay movements to the AIDS epidemic has a different affective history, although it leads to some strikingly similar outcomes. In uncovering the hidden epidemic of rape, feminists argued that women had been wrongly kept silent and ashamed for too long. They forced an unwilling public to reckon with the realities of what reducing sex to a private act actually meant in reality -a lack of sexual pleasure for women and the prospect of sexual violence. The sudden advent of AIDS, however, in a climate of an emerging discussion of nonheterosexual sexualities, further stigmatised these as unhealthy and shameful. In this context, writers such as Judith Butler have argued, it is unsurprising that the lesbian and gay movement would look to the state for recognition and legitimation. 35 For Butler, the move to state recognition, and particularly the contemporary push for gay marriage is in some ways a response to AIDS, a shamed response in which a gay community seeks to disavow its so-called promiscuity, one in which gay people appear as healthy, normal, and capable of sustaining monogamous relations. 36 The conservatism of contemporary marriage campaigns can be seen, argues Butler, in the reliance of same-sex marriage discourse on 'profound and abiding investments not only in the heterosexual couple but also in the question of what forms of relationship ought to be legitimated by the state'. 37 Butler sees these investments as tied to an explicit abandonment of the revolutionary ideal of earlier activism.
In the same way that feminist politics have become attached to an identity constituted by potential and actual violence, so contemporary gay politics have become attached to an identity based on the injury of exclusion. This leads along the same trajectory to a politics of ressentiment and powerlessness, calling for redress through the codification of recognition and a corresponding dependency on the state for legitimation. As Judith Butler writes:
To be legitimated by the state is to enter into the terms of legitimation offered there and find that one's public and recognizable sense of personhood is fundamentally dependent on the lexicon of that legitimation. Moreover, it follows that the delimitation of legitimation will take place only through an exclusion of a certain sort although not a patently dialectal one. The sphere of legitimate intimate alliance is established through producing and intensifying regions of illegitimacy.
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Reliance on state legitimation to overcome exclusion is premised therefore on the reproduction of zones of exclusion. Lesbians and gays who accept the institution of monogamous marriage may be able to step into a region of legitimacy. However, this comes at the cost of intensifying the political and social exclusion of those who still seek to form a different future based on different kinds of relationships and different models of sexuality.
This has a number of consequences, the first and most obvious being the legitimation of marriage as the most, or even only, legitimate model of sexual relationships, and a consequent policing of those who are seen to threaten that institution. As Wendy Brown comments in her discussion of the gay marriage campaign, there is 'no room to cast doubt or aspersion on the value or the meaning of the right being fought for'. 39 This not only makes 'unspeakable' the 'suggestion that gays and lesbians promulgating marriage as the ultimate sanctification of love between two people were biting from the same mythohistorical muffin as anti-gay conservatives declaring marriage to be timeless and transcendent in meaning'. 4° It also casts into the realms of illegitimacy and exclusion those who can't or won't lead the kind of life that is enforced by the institution of monogamous marriage. As Brown notes:
It is therefore hardly surprising that when a threesome unsuccessfully sought a marriage license from San Francisco city officials, they were jeered by their fellow queers: "You're ruining it for all of us," yelled the wedding-besotted crowd as the triplet of sexual deviants walked away from the courthouse. What is particularly disturbing about this example is not merely the shift in identity of those who were so recently excluded to active agents of exclusion. Also, it is the patent precariousness of the social legitimacy of those same people jeering outside the courthouse. The ongoing gains and losses of the same-sex marriage campaign are made sources of exultation and trauma respectively because subject-identity and subjectification has become tied so heavily to state recognition. As Butler argues:
Failure to secure state recognition for one's intimate arrangements can only be experienced as a form of derealization if the terms of state legitimation maintain hegemonic control over the norms of recognition -in other words, if the state monopolizes the resources of recognition.
4 2
In participating in, rather than challenging this monopolisation, the lesbian and gay movement sacrifices its ability to engage in practices of self-realisation. In gay/lesbian/queer politics, there were also significant differences between the US and Australia, made most prominent in the politics of AIDS, despite an early impulse of Australian governments to turn to the USA for guidance. 43 As Paul Sendziuk has pointed out in his discussion of the history of AIDS activism in Australia, while the early years of AIDS saw suspicion and hostility directed towards homosexuals, by and large, and certainly in comparison with the US
[t]he expected backlash against homosexuality did not occur... as Australian State and Commonwealth governmentswith the exception of the conservative states of Queensland and Tasmania -deviated from the American model and chose to incorporate representatives of the communities most affected by AIDS into a partnership with government and medical experts. They did so in order to gain their expertise in communicating with, and educating, people at risk. The result was an approach to AIDS prevention that stressed the need for community participation in education rather than the 40 As above at 3. 41 As above at 4. Sendziuk goes on to argue that the reasons for the widespread success of the early AIDS response in Australia, was that politicians, doctors and the public 'came to consider gay men, prostitutes and injecting drug users as they and their supporters imagined themselves: trustworthy'.
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The Australian state's very early involvement in AIDS prevention and incorporation of gay and lesbian activists into the very structures of its response therefore resulted in a different community relationship to the state -one of cooperation and integration, which in important ways mirrored the earlier incorporation of feminists, although it has not occurred to the same extent. This process has carried through in later decades into other areas, including the focus of the various state gay and lesbian rights lobbies on developing same-sex relationship recognition through individual state legislation, based on earlier recognition of opposite-sex de facto relationships. Systems for registering civil unions also exist in several states, territories and local jurisdictions. 'This stands in contrast to the situation in the US, where in many states de facto opposite-sex relationships remain as unrecognised as same-sex relationships, explaining the strong American focus on marriage, and the different trajectories of the demands for same-sex marriage in the two countries, particularly in the early years of these campaigns.Similarly, the various state health departments have continued to support health education catered to queer communities, tourism and event support agencies fund community activities such as the Sydney Lesbian and Gay Mardi Gras, and (limited) anti-discrimination legislation has been adopted federally, and in all states and territories. These strong state-community interactions have also provided career paths for many gay and lesbian community leaders, again echoing the earlier creation of an Australian 'femocracy'. One could say therefore that for queer communities in Australia, relations to the state are considerably more complex than in the United States, where Brown's processes of ressentient and exclusion are more clearly in play.
These differences have also led to divergences in queer politics in Australia and the US. One example is the way in which the politics of US activist group ACT-UP were adapted to the Australian context. Michael Connors has argued that the radical push of ACT-UP Australia, and particularly its 1991 D-Day campaign -a coordinated national series of actions to highlight government inaction -existed in part to support those already incorporated within government reform processes. Adam Carr described this as acting 'like a bunch of loonies who would then make other AIDS groups appear eminently reasonable'. Connors clarifies that ACT UP did exist 46 independently of existing AIDS groups. However, he notes that Carr's comments are indicative of the ways in which ACT UP's direct action was tied to the policy process, and aimed at 44 As above at 4. 45 As above at 5. supporting AIDS activists working inside the government. 47 In Carr's comments, we can see the complete subsumption of radical political activism to the state, and those working with it. External movements in this model act primarily to pressure reformist change, with those already included acting to facilitate such change.
It is clear however that it is insufficient to simply condemn the directions that feminist and queer movements have taken in response to the crises of sexuality. Both the AIDS epidemic and the epidemic of sexual violence have had real effects, and have activated genuine desires for state recompense and protection. The responses to these crises with law, have however, had a series of consequences that we believe undermine the political effectiveness and potential of these movements. In particular, through adopting a response to crisis that privileges appeals to the state on the basis of subjective wounding, queer and feminist movements have abandoned their revolutionary horizon and their sense of sex and gender relations as needing to be brought into crisis. Rather, in seeking to contain crisis, feminist and queer movements have come to mirror the regulatory policies of government. In the following sections, we trace this loss of a revolutionary horizon, and argue that the adoption of a normalising response to crisis, even the crises of AIDS and sexual violence, is ultimately self-defeating.
THE EFFECTS OF CRISIS: THE Loss OF A REVOLUTIONARY HORIZON
We are women and men who, from the time of our earliest memories, have been in revolt against the sex-role structure and nuclear family structure. The roles we have played amongst ourselves, the self-deceit, the compromises and the subterfuges -these have never totally obscured the fact that we exist outside the traditional structure -and our existence threatens it.
Martha Shelley, 197048 We are getting married and we are producing and raising children and the government is using every trick in the book in an attempt to make it go away. We will not go away.
Gay marriage is out there. It is happening. The revolution has arrived and it is about to get a lot noisier. fundamental shift in the perception of the relationship between sexuality, the law and the state.50 Specifically, it represents a re-conceptualisation of what a 'revolutionary' movement around sexuality might be. This re-conceptualisation can be seen most simply as a shift away from a direct challenge, antagonistic to the dominant sexual and social order. In its place is a conception of sexual politics in which feminist and queer demands can and should be accommodated within the dominant structure, and where the primary vehicle for delivering them is the state itself. Shelley's position derived from the Gay Liberation Front's assertion 'that complete sexual liberation for all people cannot come about unless existing social institutions are abolished'.,' In contrast, for Phelps the gay revolution is to be found in the fact that homosexuals are already 'getting married' and 'producing and raising children'. In other words, the liberation of lesbians and gays occurs through their inclusion within the very institutions whose abolition the Gay Liberation Front sought. In essence, the 'liberatory' desires of sexual politics have been largely devolved into a process of inclusion and the place of 'crisis' as something brought on by movements, rather than resisted by them has been lost. While lesbians and gays initially spoke from a position of social and political exclusion, heterosexual women were fighting against their almost complete subsumption within these hegemonic models and institutions. The founding moment of the second wave feminist movement is often located in the publication of Betty Freidan's The Feminine Mystique, which railed against the sacrifice of women's subjectivity that existed at the centre of the nuclear family and married heterosexual couple. s2 In the 1970s, as discussed above, sex came even more to the fore, with the dual focus on women's sexuality and the danger of sexual violence. In this early period, radical feminism was driven by two utopian sexual visions -that of a world free of sexual violence and a world in which women could reclaim and re-imagine their sexuality. From the beginning, however, feminists struggled to embrace both a revolutionary re-imagining of women's sexuality and an analysis of the destructive force that sexual violence has had in the lives of many women. The identification of sexuality as a realm of both 'pleasure and danger', to quote the title of one influential 1980s collection on the subject, has historically proved a difficult balance to maintain.5 3 In the 'sex wars' of the 1980s, following the (in)famous Barnard conference on sexuality of 1982, feminism split into two opposed camps -those in the anti-violence movements who saw sex as almost solely a realm of danger and trauma, and the 'pro-sex' movements who often portrayed sex as in itself a revolutionary or radical practice.
The conflict of the 1980s demonstrated that one 1970s shortcut to utopia was not only impractical but insufficient. Lesbian feminist movements of the 1970s had been able to resolve feminism's contradictory understanding of sexuality by essentialising and gendering it. Men were seen to be inherently violent and women automatically violated and degraded in sexual relationships with them. On the other side, lesbian relationships were idealised as not only inherently radical but also an inherently equal and liberating model of sexuality. The feminism of the 1970s therefore found its utopia in a vision of a world without men, an image that has inspired women as diverse as Valerie Solanas and Shere Hite. 54 By identifying the danger of sex with men and the pleasure with women, the 1970s vision of lesbian women-only utopias seemed to solve the problem of sex. However, as the sex wars of the 1980s would make clear, the feminist crisis of desire was not so easy to solve. The problem was simply that many women rejected the 'liberated' and utopian model of sexuality offered by lesbian feminism. By the 1980s, many vocal critics were arguing that in attempting to define the danger out of lesbian sexuality, feminists had desexualised lesbians. Additionally, women began to speak about the large-scale policing of desire and sexual practices that went on in lesbian feminist communities. 55 Lesbian feminists were said to have drafted a whole set of rules of acceptable and unacceptable lesbian sexual conduct. Practices such as penetration were seen to be either aping male behaviours or conforming to male fantasies. By identifying these practices as 'male-identified' they were defined out of the woman-centred model of sexualitv. With the sex wars of the 1980s, when women began to talk not only of penetrative sex, but of enjoying pornography and sado-masochism and identifying as butch and femme, and even proudly embracing heterosexuality, the image of a utopia based merely on an absence of men dissolved and no other revolutionary imagining of sexual transformation has emerged from within feminism.
5 6 The central ideas of an overthrowing of gender and the creation of a society in which sex and desire look radically different from their current manifestations are markedly absent from contemporary feminist politics.
Early gay liberationists saw their politics as also being about such a radical overthrowing of sexual structures and gender roles, as demonstrated in the Martha Shelley quote above. Dennis Altman's famous book Homosexual: Oppression and Liberaion outlined Gay Liberation's particular fusion of a radical critique of capitalism and a demand for the 'end of the homosexual' (as Altman's final chapter was titled). In his book, Altman highlighted the liberatory desire for 'polymorphously perverse' sexualities, which would eradicate sexual categorisation and ultimately lead to the elimination of gender as well . This utopian ideal began to whittle away with the 54 Solanas was a radical feminist activist and writer known for her SCUM Manifesto (1968), in which she argued for the gendercide of men. She also attempted to assassinate Andy Warhol the same year. Hite is a feminist sex educator whose work demonstrated that orgasm is achieved more easily for most women via clitoral stimulation, rather than through vaginal penetration. The utopian imagining of a world without men has also led to a specifically feminist version of 'technoutopia' based on reproductive technologies and test-tube babies. one example of such a revolutionary politics of sexuality emerging from within feminism. The reviewer also pointed to radical pro-sex feminist publications such as Wlicked Women, a regular journal published in Australia during the 1980s and 1990s. While we certainly agree that queer theory has made significant theoretical interventions, its capacity to translate this into a revolutionary political strategy is less clear. decline of the Gay Liberation Front and the uneven and changing queer relationship to the law over the 1970s. It ultimately became entirely marginal with the onset of the AIDS crisis in the 1980s, when earlier trends towards defining a coherent community of gay men, and to a lesser extent lesbians, became a political imperative in responding to illness, fear and the need to engage with the state. As this turn to the state that we outline above advanced, the earlier utopian ideal of a permanendy changed sexual system for al/disappeared.
A second crisis in the 1980s also led to a reconceptualisation of queer relations to the law. This came with the arrival of mass panic around child sexuality. Since the early days of Gay Liberation, unequal age of consent laws, even their very existence, have been subject to criticism and debate. For many early Gay Liberationists, state intervention into child sexuaity was purely a means of typecasting gays as predators, and for clamping down on adolescent explorations of sexuality. Liberationists argued that there was therefore a need to remove the state's power to intervene in sexual relations, rather than shore it up with laws that arbitrarily penalised sex on the basis of age. With the arrival, however, of the moral panic around paedophilia in the 1980s (that corresponded with the feminist exposure of the epidemic of sexual assault), these early probings of complex intersections of sex, age and power were sidelined and marginalised.5 8 This was to become an important moment in the mainstream adoption of 'sex as crisis' discourses, as indicated by our opening discussion. In particular, as Steven Angelides has pointed out in his recent work on paedophilia and homosexuality, the figure of the child came to stand in for a generalised sexual vulnerability, and is therefore a key site for the playing out of contemporary fears around sex, violence and sexuality.5 9 An early precursor to this discursive shift can be found in a conversation between Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem and journalist Jean Danet, held on April 4, 1978.60 In a discussion about their failed attempt to eradicate French age of consent laws, Foucault makes the perceptive comment that a new form of penal and legislative system was emerging not only in France but in the USA and elsewhere. This new system emerged as a result of the disintegration of earlier legal prohibitions against various ill-defined indecent acts (contraventions of, in French, pudeur). The function of this new system, which according to Foucault was necessary as concepts of decency became attached to certain particular cultures and values, 'is not so much to punish offences against these general laws concerning decency, as to protect populations and parts of populations regarded as particularly vulnerable'. 61 This was a profound change from earlier restrictions however, and, like those earlier laws, had a disproportionate effect on queer people and a lasting impact on perceptions of sexuality. Perversely this shift came as a result of the successes of the earlier gay campaigns' exposure and reform of disproportionately applied legal strictures on indecency. The cost of the success in changing normative models of 'decency', to the extent that these changes themselves come to be part of normative attitudes, is the foreclosing of the possibility of a radical break. For Foucault, the construction of, on one side, a 'fragile' population and, on the other, a 'dangerous' one is based on a double psychiatric/psychological intervention into sexuality (an acceptance of diverse sexualities alongside a distinction of certain sexualities, most notably those of children, as distinct and separate from the sexualities of adults), resulting in a need for the intervention of the law as protection from (adult) desire:
We're going to have a society of dangers, with, on the one side, those who are in danger, and on the other, those who are dangerous. And sexuality will no longer be a kind of behavior hedged in by precise prohibitions, but a kind of roaming danger, a sort of omnipresent phantom, a phantom that will be played out between men and women, children and adults, and possibly between adults themselves, etc. Sexuality will become a threat in all social relations, in all relations between members of different age groups, in all relations between individuals. It is on this shadow, this phantom, this fear that the authorities would try to get a grip through an apparently generous and, at least general, legislation and through a series of particular interventions that would probably be made by the legal institutions, with the support of the medical institutions.
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Foucault in many ways predicts the processes we have charted above. As seen in comments such as those of Kevin Rudd and Stephen Conroy, the danger of sex is no longer the private sexualities or individual acts of society's members, which are largely legal and tolerated, but this-very phantom danger that intervenes in all social relations, marking sex as a threat and opening up the space for further legal intervention into the sexual lives of us all.
In contemporary Australia then, a dual process is occurring that has dramatically altered the underlying assumptions about the interactions between feminist and queer politics, the Australian state and its law. On the one hand, there is a broad-based perception of a crisis in normative sexuality, captured in John Howard's simple homophobia, and the broader Howard/Rudd panic around child sexuality and pornography. This broad-based 'roaming danger' has come over the course of the Howard and Rudd governments to be understood as a threat to social relations and requiring of state intervention across many more aspects of our sexual lives. On the other hand, the turn to the state and to law by those that have historically provided the point of critique that has so fundamentally changed attitudes to gender and sexuality has resulted in the inability to mount a sustained critique at moments when the 'roaming danger' of sex comes into particular relief. Witness the Henson debate with which we opened this article. We have discussed elsewhere the Left's failure in this instance to mount any meaningful critique that did
As above at 281. not rely on liberal or conservative demands. 63 However, we argue that this is not a simple one-off failure, but a reflection of a broader problem in feminist and queer politics. With the consolidation of the state and law as both protector of identity and protector from harm, the possibility of critique is foreclosed. Ultimately, queer and feminist critique comes to be framed as antagonistic to the desires of the very communities it emerges from. This antagonism can be seen most clearly in the use of regulatory and control mechanisms by members of these communities themselves, as was demonstrated in Wendy Brown's example of the threesome seeking marriage. An important instance of this process can be seen in queer and feminist uses of anti-discrimination legislation. Originally conceived as a necessary and important means of breaking with historic workplace and social discrimination against women, queers and other minorities, in recent years this has become a method to enforce exclusion of others by those very groups. Of particular note is the case surrounding a recent exemption from the Victorian Equal Opportuniy Act (1995) provided to the Peel Hotel, a Melbourne pub and nightclub, which permits that establishment to refuse or restrict entry to [the venue] to people who do not identify as homosexual males where to allow entr, or unrestricted entry would, in the opinion of the applicant, its agent or employee, adversely affect the safety or comfort of the venue for its homosexual male patrons, or the nature of that venue as a venue primarily for homosexual male patrons; and to advertise those matters. 64 This exemption follows earlier exemptions provided to a women-only gym, a gay dance party promoter, gay sex-on-premises venues, student associations and others, and is justified by the need to maintain exclusions between different sexes and sexualities. 65 The Peel's owner Tom McFeely was quoted at the time as saying that the step was necessary to 'protect the integrity of McFeelv was faced with numerous queries about exactly how he could determine the sexuality of his (male) clientele at the door, with his response being simply, 'with experience you can tell'.
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Whatever one thinks of this particular business' right to discriminate or choose its own clientele, the response to the perceived crisis of 'swamping' of gay spaces relies on the blunt instruments of the state and the law, and the reinforcement of a rigid definition of the male homosexual subject, as defined, in this instance, by McFeely. That this example demonstrates not only this legal reliance, but also a commitment to inflexible and (to the 'experienced' eye) externally observable markers of (homo)sexuality is disturbing, as is the further distinction made between ostensibly male 'homosexuals' and women, explicitly lesbians. The process of exclusion therefore is not simply about freedom from dominant heterosexuality, but also enables the space of male homosexual sociality to be defined as one which by necessity excludes women, resulting in the structural reinforcement of misogyny in gay male space. When access to public and commercial spaces is considered in relation to economic and social power, it is clear that the Peel's exemption will impact most heavily not on heterosexual men and women but precisely on lesbians, and even more so on trans and other non-normative gender identities. The very mechanisms that were created out of a desire to expand access and limit damage have, with a narrative of crisis and through the processes we have described above, facilitated the reverse -state support and legal justification for limiting sexual and gender expression.
BEYOND THE DESIRE FOR LAW
The strategy of calling on the state for protection and recognition clearly has its benefits. Antidiscrimination legislation has worked to reduce discriminatory practices in workplaces and society more broadly. The feminist anti-rape movement has also demonstrated that real reforms and benefits can be won, particularly in the criminal justice system. However, the feminist example demonstrates that the strategy of legal reform is limited in the change that it can produce. While laws and policies surrounding police and court practices for dealing with sexual assault complainants have been transformed, their impact at the level of legal practice has been repeatedly questioned. 69 The primary peril, however, for feminist reform efforts may be that that the antirape movement has ceased contesting law's power to define and judge women's lives, instead shifting to implicitly supporting and legitimating the power of law. As feminist criminologist and legal theorist Carol Smart has argued, the main effect of attempts to use the law to protect women is to empower the law itself and extend its imperialist reach. In the case of rape particularly, this exacerbates a circular logic that rape can only be feared and legally redressed rather than fought by women themselves. The law and legal deterrence is ultimately about the state persuading men not to rape. For women to base politics on an appeal to the state is to concede this power to men. 71 It does not envision in any way removing this power from men's hands, nor does it consider that it may be possible to attempt to stop rape ourselves, rather than 'to have our raped selves vindicated in court. Similarly, queer reliance on anti-discrimination law abandons any real belief in transformative social change. Instead, it bolsters a narrowly defined set of sexual and gender identities that the state says it can protect through disciplining both offenders against these identities and those that step outside of their bounds. In the words of Wendy Brown, it is perhaps the successes as much as the failures of feminist and queer reform efforts that have dissuaded us from considering 'the perils of pursuing emancipator political aims within largely repressive, regulatory, and depoliticising institutions that themselves carry elements of the regime whose subversion is being sought'. 73 Ultimately, it is with the possibilities for the subversion of the dominant regime of sex and sexuality that we, as theorists and activists, are concerned. In Australia particularly, we argue, queer and feminist movements' implication in the regulation of sex as crisis, is intimately tied to their loss of a desire to initiate a crisis within dominant modes of sex and sexuality. With this loss has also gone much of their force as movements for transformative change. Dreams of a world liberated from sexual restriction and gender division have disappeared in favour of a turn towards the state, and a call for increasing regulation. In the cases of the Peel Hotel's anti-discrimination exemption, and the same-sex marriage campaigns, we can see the continued failure of feminist and queer politics to move beyond what Wendy Brown has called the 'inceptive self-cancellation' of the instinct for freedom. She writes:
Initial figurations of freedom are inevitably reactionary in the sense of emerging in reaction to perceived injuries or constraints of a regime from within its own terms. Ideals of freedom ordinarily emerge to vanquish their imagined immediate enemies, but in this move they frequently recycle and reinstate rather than transform the terms of domination that generated them. Consider exploited workers who dream of a world in which work has been abolished, blacks who imagine a world without whites, feminists who conjure a world either without men or without sex, or teenagers who fantasize a world without parents. This process of inversion and negative proscriptions continues, even within more radical elements of these communities, who struggle with simplistic binaries constructed out of a desire for difference, rather than change. The limitations of the radical visions at the heart of feminist and queer politics, utopias conceived of worlds without men or without the heterosexual couple have found their final expression in a limited and restrictive politics of negation and conformity. This is why, in probing the potential for a new revolutionary spirit, it is important to avoid uncritically calling for a return to the past. The legitimate feminist demand for an accounting for the epidemic of sexual assault and the unimaginable impact of the epidemic of AIDS combined to shut down a radical imagining and turn the focus of attention to the state. In addition, in a time when other social movements have also faltered, and the great (if not in reality all that good) alternative to capitalism has been lost in the failings of communist states, there is a recognisable and understandable fear of utopian ideas and revolutionary projects. As lamentable as the loss of utopian vision may be, we need to find a way of avowing that loss that may also enable us to see what we have gained. Wendy Brown writes:
If we are without revolutionary possibility today, we are also free of revolution as the paradigm of transformation... On the other hand, avowing our loss allows us to cultivate the memory ... of the utopian imaginary of the revolutionary paradigm and so make that imaginary part of our knowledge for working in the present, not just a lament about the unrevolutionary present."
We must seek to nourish both the remembered imaginary of a utopian impulse, and the freedom of an open future that may help us to move beyond the limitations of political projects that have come before. We consider the most important responses to the contemporary situation to be those that can embrace openness and uncertainty -the necessary crisis at the heart of critique. As the turn to the state forecloses radical alternatives, the radical response should be not to fear crises of sex but to initiate them. In doing so, it may be possible to prompt a further breaking down of normative sexuality and reinscribe a sexual politics of freedom, by which we do not mean a simplistic individual autonomy, or a reactionary liberal selfishness. Instead, we see the radical project as the continued, collective project of liberation -the idea that individual freedom comes only through 'a project of making a world with others'.
7 6 This project, as Wendy Brown has commented, means not simply to look to some sort of sharing of power or collective engagement with the powers that condition our lives, but also requires reckoning with the unknowable, the enigmatic, the uncomfortable, without then ceding to a radical libertarian 'let us all go off with our differences' as if they were natural and ahistorical.' Ultimately we do not know where such a path will lead. Rather, we think that what is needed is something akin to Marxist critic Slavoj 7i~ek's call to 'repeat' Lenin. Zikek argues that what is necessary is to recreate Lenin's 'leap of faith' into the unknown, not in the derivative, undergraduate 'vanguardism' of capital-L Leninist organisations but in a truly undefined way, armed with no certainty but the willingness to create an open situation. Zi~ek concludes his essay on Lenin by asking if we, and by we he specifically includes radical queer and feminist academics, are 'still able to experience the shattering impact of such an authentic historical openness?' 78 For us, this 'shattering impact', as daunting as it may seem, holds far more appeal, and certainly much greater potential for revolutionary change, than the security of attaching ourselves to the state in order to rescue us from sex. 0
